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INTRODUCTION

What is the appropriate punishment for those who commit unimaginable
crimes? Can the sentence for an individual who records himself sexually
abusing a three-year old girl ever be too harsh? While such acts should
indeed be duly punished, it is important to restrain judicial discretion in
imposing criminal sentences. To that effect, safeguards exist to prevent the
unjust double sentencing of criminals for the same offense.1 However,
these safeguards fail when statutorily ambiguous language allows judges to
impose an additional sentence based on a factor of a crime that has already
been accounted for in the underlying base sentence.2
The interpretation of an ambiguous statute was the central issue before
the United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit, which had to decide
whether the district court appropriately applied the vulnerable victim
sentencing enhancement in addition to applying a sentencing enhancement
for crimes committed against victims under the age of twelve years old.3 In
United States v. Dowell, a case involving the production and transportation
of child pornography, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court
erroneously applied the vulnerable victim enhancement because the
victim’s age had already been accounted for in the victim under twelve
years old enhancement.4 The Fourth Circuit departed from the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, which had upheld the application of the vulnerable victim
enhancement in child pornography cases, creating a circuit split.5
This Comment argues the Fourth Circuit correctly held that the
vulnerable victim enhancement should not be applied when the underlying
offense has already accounted for the victims’ age. Part II explains the
Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the vulnerable victim enhancement.6
Part II also presents the competing arguments of the Fourth Circuit and the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits.7 Part III of this Comment argues that the district
1. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
2. See generally Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law
Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 397 (1991) (illustrating the initial Congressional goals of
sentencing reform and the general authority granted to the Sentencing Commission).
3. See United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2014).
4. See id. at 174.
5. Accord United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Wright, 373 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (focusing on the fact that a very
young child is developmentally and psychologically different than an older minor
child).
6. See infra Parts II.A - I.C.
7. See infra Part II.D.
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court in Dowell erred in finding that a young child’s cognitive
underdevelopment is sufficiently distinct from young age.8 Part III also
argues that the Fourth Circuit correctly held that factors like the cognitive
and psychological development of a three-year old are intimately linked
with age itself; Part III also presents case law from sister circuits to support
the Fourth Circuit.9 Finally, Part III concludes by arguing that the district
court in Dowell could have alternatively applied the vulnerable victim
enhancement because the victims were vulnerable, not due to their age, but
because they were left without parental supervision and were assaulted
multiple times in their own residence.10
II. BACKGROUND
A. Understanding the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual sets out a uniform sentencing
policy for defendants based on the relationship between the offense
conduct and the defendant’s criminal history. The Manual provides several
victim-related upward enhancements for categories such as hate crime
motivation, vulnerable victims, and serious human rights offenses, which
can increase a defendant’s sentence.11 The Sentencing Commission
provides further guidance by releasing Official Commentary to the
Guidelines Manual.12 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the
Commentary in the Guidelines Manual, which interprets or explains a
guideline, is authoritative unless it violates the U.S. Constitution, is
inconsistent with, or is a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.13
Thus, the Commentary serves as more than a mere guideline for
interpretation and actually operates as binding law.14
B. Understanding the Vulnerable Victim Enhancement
The Guidelines Manual states that the defendant’s sentence will increase
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.C.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2X5.2, 3A1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2014); see generally Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681
(1992) (discussing the negative ramifications of the Sentencing Guidelines and its
effects on a judge’s ability to impose sentences).
12. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2014) (submitting to Congress amendments,
policy statements, and official commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines).
13. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
14. See id.
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if the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense
was a vulnerable victim.15 The Guidelines Manual defines a vulnerable
victim as a person who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or
mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the
criminal conduct.16 The Commentary instructs that the vulnerable victim
enhancement should not be applied if the factor that makes the person a
vulnerable victim is already incorporated in the offense guideline.17 It
explains that if the underlying offense guideline provides a separate
enhancement for the age of the victim, the vulnerable victim enhancement
would not be applied unless the victim was unusually vulnerable for
reasons unrelated to age.18 Because age is often a factor upon which the
vulnerability is founded, the issue of double counting often presents itself
when courts attempt to apply both the vulnerable victim enhancement and
the victim under twelve enhancement, which can be applied to offenses
against victims under the age of twelve years old.
C. The Differing Applications of the Vulnerable Victim Enhancements by
the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
1.

The Fourth Circuit

In United States v. Dowell, Dowell was staying at the victim’s residence
in Virginia when he recorded several videos of himself sexually abusing a
three-year old girl (“Minor A”) and a five-year old girl (“Minor B”).19
Dowell pleaded guilty to twelve counts production of child pornography.20
Dowell appealed the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) recommendation that he
should receive both a vulnerable victim enhancement and victim under
twelve enhancement.21 He argued that because the age of the victims was
already accounted for by the application of the victim under twelve
enhancement, the additional application of the vulnerable victim
enhancement could not be applied.22 Because the victims’ ages were
accounted for in the victim under twelve enhancement, Dowell argued that
15. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2014).
16. See id. at cmt. n.2 (providing examples of a vulnerable victim in a fraud case
in which a defendant who markets an ineffective cancer cure or in a robbery in which a
defendant selects a handicapped victim).
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 2013).
19. See United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2014).
20. See id. at 165.
21. See id. at 166.
22. See id.
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the victims could not be found ‘vulnerable’ for purposes of the vulnerable
victim enhancement simply because his victims were considerably younger
than twelve years of age.23 Rejecting Dowell’s arguments, the district court
applied the vulnerable victim enhancement with respect to Minor A based
on concerns over her cognitive and psychological development, which are
unique to a three-year old child.24 Relying on Fifth and Ninth Circuit
precedent, the district court found that though these developmental
concerns were related to her age, the court explained that because these
vulnerabilities could exist independently of age it indicated a vulnerability
beyond age per se.25
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning and
found that the district court’s ultimate reason for applying the vulnerable
victim enhancement relied on age-related factors.26 The cognitive delays
and psychological vulnerabilities of Minor A were solely due to her young
age and therefore the finding of vulnerability was not sufficiently separate
from her age.27 The Fourth Circuit’s holding created a circuit split in the
application of the vulnerable victim enhancement.28
2.

The Fifth Circuit

In United States v. Jenkins, Jenkins was charged with possessing child
pornography, including that of infants and toddlers.29 Jenkins pleaded
guilty, and the PSR recommended both the victim under twelve and
vulnerable victim enhancements.30 Though the PSR noted the age of the
victims ranged from toddlers to early teenagers, the report characterized the
young and small victims as vulnerable because they were unable to resist or
object, which made them particularly susceptible to abuse and
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id; see also United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2013)

(using the example of an infant’s inability to walk as an example of a vulnerability that
is related to, but still distinct from, extreme young age); United States v. Wright, 373
F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the characteristics of being an infant are
correlated with age but warrant a separate vulnerability because they can exist
independently of age).
26. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174 (finding unpersuasive the district court’s
argument that the particular cognitive and moral vulnerabilities as related to age but
unaccounted for by the victim under twelve enhancement).
27. See id.
28. Compare id. (declining to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement), with
Jenkins, 712 F.3d at 214, and Wright, 373 F.3d at 943 (applying the vulnerable victim
enhancement).
29. See Jenkins, 712 F.3d at 211.
30. See id.
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exploitation.31 Jenkins objected to the vulnerable victim enhancement,
arguing that because any child pornography offense would seemingly
involve a vulnerable victim, the specific offense enhancement already
addressed the age factor.32 The district court rejected Jenkins’ argument
and held that the two enhancements accounted for distinct vulnerabilities.33
The Fifth Circuit found no logical reason why an enhancement for a
victim under the age of twelve should bar the application of the vulnerable
victim enhancement when the victim is especially vulnerable compared to
most children under twelve.34 For example, the court noted that some
children under twelve, such as infants, are unable to walk due to extreme
young age, while other children under twelve may be unable to walk due to
paralysis.35 The court dismissed Jenkins’ argument, which presupposed
that the vulnerable victim enhancement based on inability to walk would be
applied to paralyzed children under twelve, but not to infants.36 The Court
distinguished that though an infant’s inability to walk is “related to age,” it
is not fully accounted for by the victim under twelve enhancement.37 In
this way, the relevance of age in categorizing a victim as both under twelve
and especially vulnerable is not mutually exclusive.
3.

The Ninth Circuit

In United States v. Wright, defendants James Wright and Tracey Wright
were convicted for the production of child pornography of their 11-month
old son and other children.38 The district court applied both the victim
under twelve and vulnerable victim enhancements.39 The district court
reasoned that the victims were vulnerable due to their extremely young age
and small physical size.40
These factors demonstrated why the

31. See id.
32. See id. at 211-12.
33. See id. at 214 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that while a

factor may be related to age, it is not fully accounted for by the victim under twelve
enhancement).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 213.
36. See id. at 213-14.
37. See id. (noting the inconsistency of how the vulnerable victim enhancement
commentary would bar a court from applying the enhancement where the victim is
vulnerable from extreme old age).
38. See United States v. Wright, 373 F.3d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 942 (relying on similar factors of extremely young age and size in
applying the vulnerable victim enhancement to Tracey’s sentence as well).
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vulnerability of the child was distinct from age itself.41 On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, the defendants argued that the factors of extreme youth and
small physical size were impermissible because both related to age, which
had already been accounted for by the victim under twelve enhancement.42
The Ninth Circuit explained that the victim under twelve enhancement did
not fully account for the especially vulnerable infancy and toddler stages of
childhood.43 The Ninth Circuit concluded that although the characteristics
of infancy and toddlerhood correlate with age, they can exist independently
of age, and thus are not the same as merely not having attained the age of
twelve years old.44
D. Uncontested Examples of the Application of the Vulnerable Victim
Enhancement from Other Circuits
The application of the vulnerable victim enhancement by other circuit
courts provides examples of appropriate characteristics that indicate a
vulnerability.45 The common thread is the finding of vulnerability based on
a factor that is completely separate and distinct from the underlying
offense.46 Thus, conditions that make a three-year old more vulnerable
than an eleven-year old can support the application of the vulnerable victim
enhancement.47 For example, in United States v. Grubbs, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the vulnerable victim enhancement because the defendant
lured his victims by giving them higher grades and gifts and enticing them
with the promise of scholarships.48 Similarly, in United States v. Irving, the
Second Circuit applied the vulnerable victim enhancement because the
victims were homeless, impoverished, and without parental or other
appropriate guidance.49
In United States v. Willoughby, the Sixth Circuit held that a sixteen-year
old girl was vulnerable because she was a homeless runaway with a history

41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 943 (concluding then that there is no “double-counting of age in

considering infancy or the toddler stage as an additional vulnerability”).
44. See id.
45. See United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793,
805-06 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2002).
46. See Willoughby, 742 F.3d at 241; Irving, 554 F.3d at 75; Grubbs, 585 F.3d at
805-06; Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 412.
47. United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2014).
48. See Grubbs, 585 F.3d at 806.
49. See Irving, 554 F.3d at 75.
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of abuse and neglect.50 In United States v. Gawthrop, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the enhancement for a defendant’s three-year old granddaughter
on the basis of a familial relationship, not age.51 In United States v. Snyder,
the Seventh Circuit applied the enhancement for a victim based on his
history of past molestation, rather than his age.52 In United States v.
Wetchie, the Ninth Circuit found a way to distinguish the potential
overlapping factor of age by finding that an eleven-year old victim
qualified for the enhancement because the assault occurred while she was
asleep.53 Finally, in United States v. Archdale, the Ninth Circuit applied
the enhancement to a twelve-year old child who vulnerable because she
was cognitively delayed.54
III. ANALYSIS
A. The District Court in Dowell Erred in Concluding a Young Child’s
Cognitive Underdevelopment is Sufficiently Distinct from Young Age
In making its decision, the district court in United States v. Dowell
erroneously relied on the previous holdings of United States v. Wright and
United States v. Jenkins, which held that the characteristics of being an
infant, while related to age, could exist independently of age; and thus, not
wholly accounted for by age itself.55 The district court explained that
50. See Willoughby, 742 F.3d at 241 (noting that this case does not add to the
particular circuit split discussed in this Comment because vulnerability due to age was
not at issue).
51. See Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 412. But see United States v. Wright, 373 F.3d
935, 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the vulnerable victim enhancement on the basis of
the victim’s vulnerable characteristics based on the infancy and toddler stages of
childhood rather than on the basis that the eleven-month old victim was also the
defendants’ son).
52. See United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1999)
(emphasizing the appropriateness of the vulnerable victim enhancement because the
defendant sexually assaulted the victim knowing that the victim had been molested in
the past).
53. See United States v. Wetchie, 207 F.3d 632, 634 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (agreeing
that age could not be considered in the vulnerable victim calculation because it was
already incorporated in the underlying offense); see also United States v. Ramos, 739
F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2014) (declining to apply the vulnerable victim
enhancement to a group of young boys whose vulnerability was based on the sadistic
conduct of the defendant, which was already accounted for as the basis for the sadisticconduct enhancement).
54. See United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 869 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating
that age could not be considered, despite the victim not being under twelve years old,
because the underlying offense still took her age into account).
55. See United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2014) (“At
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Minor A, the three-year old girl, was clearly vulnerable because her
cognitive abilities did not allow her to appreciate what was happening to
her – she was unable to comprehend the sequence of abuse that was
inflicted on her.56 The court focused on the cognitive development, or
rather lack thereof, of Minor A as evidenced by the progression of abuse in
this case.57 The court explained that Minor A, due to her cognitive state,
thought Dowell was just playing with her as she giggled and laughed along
at his conduct.58
Minor A’s behavior demonstrates the particular
psychological vulnerability of Minor A, as opposed to Minor B, who was
two years older.59
The court pointed out that the victim under twelve enhancement does not
adequately cover all situations in which the victim is a minor child.60 For
instance, because the victim under twelve enhancement leaves gaps in
sentencing coverage, the additional application of the vulnerable victim
enhancement is not proscribed per se and is in fact necessary in certain
situations.61 One such situation is evidenced by the stark difference in the
abuse inflicted on Minor A and Minor B, as shown by the differences in
their reactions to the abuse.62
Aside from cognitive development, there are other situations in which
the vulnerable victim enhancement may be appropriately compounded with
the victim under twelve enhancement.63 For instance, a victim may be
especially vulnerable due to his inability to walk, thereby placing him at
greater risk for assault.64 But determining whether the vulnerable victim
enhancement applies must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in light of
the underlying offense. Thus, if the underlying offense accounts for young
age, such as a child pornography related offense, a victim who is unable to

sentencing, the district court relied on recent case law from two of our sister
courts . . . .”); see also United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2013);
Wright, 373 F.3d at 943.
56. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174 (reaching this conclusion after watching the video
evidence of Dowell’s abuse on Minor A).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 173 (explaining further that over the course of several months of
abuse, Minor A went from telling the defendant “no” to requesting such conduct).
59. See id. at 174.
60. See id. at 173 (explaining that the victim under twelve enhancement treats both
Minor A and Minor B as the same since they are both under twelve years old, but
misses the particular psychological harm inflicted on Minor A).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See United States v. Ramos, 739 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2014).
64. See id. at 252.
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walk may be categorized as a vulnerable victim only if his inability to walk
is due to a non-age related reason.65 For instance, the enhancement would
be acceptable if the victim’s inability to walk was due to paralysis or a
physical deformity.66 Conversely, if the victim was unable to walk due to
infancy or young age, the vulnerable victim enhancement would be
impermissible double counting.67
The Dowell court assigned Minor A the vulnerable victim status because
she was much more psychologically susceptible to accepting and
welcoming sexual abuse than an older child would have been.68 Thus, it
was not Minor A’s age that necessitated the vulnerable victim
enhancement, but rather her reaction to the abuse based on her level of
cognitive development.69 Because the vulnerable victim enhancement
statute can only be applied in situations where the victim is vulnerable for
reasons other than age, the court attempted to carve out a factual distinction
between age and cognitive development.70 However, the problem with the
court’s reasoning is that the basis of Minor A’s underdeveloped
psychological and cognitive abilities solely related to her young age.71
Though underdeveloped cognitive faculties are not always caused by young
age, Minor A’s particular stage of cognitive development was due entirely
to her age.72 Based on the court’s finding of vulnerability of Dowell’s
victim based on her cognitive and psychological development, which was
solely attributable to her age, the Fourth Circuit correctly categorized the
vulnerable victim enhancement to Dowell’s sentence as impermissible
double counting.73
1. The Fourth Circuit’s Holding is Supported by the Findings of its Sister
Circuits
Though the Fourth Circuit in Dowell rejected the district court’s
application of the vulnerable victim enhancement, the district applied the
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Ramos, 739 F.3d at 252.
See id.
See id.
See United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 173-74 (justifying why Minor A’s
reactions to the abuse warrant her vulnerable victim status).
69. See id. at 173.
70. See id. at 174 (relying on the precedent of the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, though ultimately being rejected on appeal by the Fourth Circuit).
71. See id. at 175.
72. See id.; see also United States v. Ramos, 739 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the factor that makes a person a vulnerable victim should be analyzed in
light of whether that factor is incorporated into the offense guideline).
73. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174.
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correct legal standard – simply to the wrong facts.74 The finding that Minor
A was especially vulnerable due to her underdeveloped cognitive faculties
was not inherently incorrect because the vulnerable victim enhancement
may be predicated on a finding of cognitive impairment, as long as such
impairment exists independently of age.75 In Archdale, the court found that
a victim was especially vulnerable because she was cognitively delayed,
had borderline intelligence, and participated in special education classes.76
In fact, the vulnerable victim enhancement statute expressly enumerates
“mental condition” as an example of factors upon which to predicate a
victim’s vulnerability.77 Thus, the district court in Dowell was not wholly
incorrect in finding that Minor A could be particularly vulnerable due to
her cognitive and psychological underdevelopment.78
The district court’s reasoning in determining that Minor A was
vulnerable is distinguished from the Archdale holding in that Minor A’s
underdeveloped cognitive faculties were a result of her age.79 The victim
in Archdale, on the other hand, was twelve years old, but the underlying
offense was for abusive sexual contact rather than an age related offense
like child abuse or child pornography.80
Thus, the cognitive
underdevelopment of the Archdale victim was an appropriate basis upon
which to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement.81
Additionally, the mental condition of the victim in Archdale was not due
to the fact that she was young and had not reached an age where cognitive
faculties would be fully developed.82 Rather, the Archdale victim was
cognitively delayed, had borderline intelligence, and participated in special
education classes.83 Though the qualities of mental impairment that make a
victim vulnerable are not less significant depending on the reason for the
mental impairment, the vulnerable victim enhancement was not intended to
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id.
See generally United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 869 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 869.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
78. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174 (stating that Minor A’s cognitive abilities did not
allow her to appreciate what was being done to her and was more psychologically
susceptible to accepting abuse than an older child would be).
79. See id.
80. See Archdale, 229 F.3d at 864.
81. See id. (convicting Archdale of one count of sexual abuse of a minor and one
count of engaging in abusive sexual contact with a minor).
82. See id. at 869.
83. See id. (affirming the finding by the district court judge that the victim was
unusually vulnerable due to her mental condition).
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apply to situations where the underlying offense had already fully
incorporated the vulnerability.84 The focus here is not necessarily on what
makes the victim particularly vulnerable, but rather on the inherent
unfairness in faulting a defendant twice for the same crime.85
The application of the vulnerable victim enhancement is not per se
precluded by the fact that a defendant engaged in the sexual assault of a
minor.86 In United States v. Wetchie, the Ninth Circuit predicated an
application of the vulnerable victim enhancement based on the fact that the
victim was asleep during her sexual assault.87 The court determined that
the physical condition of her being asleep rendered her unable to resist the
defendant’s physical advances and unable to express any objection or cry
out.88 The district court in Dowell noted a similar finding, basing the
vulnerability of the three-year-old victim on the fact that she was unaware
of what was being done to her; and therefore, welcomed the abuse rather
than resist it.89 Thus, the characteristics of a victim’s diminished capacity
to resist and call for help can support the application of the vulnerable
victim enhancement.90
However, the district court’s error is not in determining that Minor A had
particular vulnerabilities; rather, the error stemmed from the fact that the
particular vulnerability was entirely due to the victim’s young age.91 In
Dowell, the victim’s diminished capacity and inability to resist her abuse
resulted from the fact that she was three-years-old.92 In Wetchie, the
victim’s inability to resist and call for help was not due to her age, but
because she was asleep and unaware of her abuse.93 The language in the
vulnerable victim enhancement statute supports the latter argument, not the
former.94 For example, it would be incorrect to treat as equal a victim’s

84. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
85. See id; see also Freed, supra note 11, at 1681.
86. See generally United States v. Wetchie, 207 F.3d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that victims who are particularly vulnerable are in need of greater societal
protection).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2014).
90. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (referencing mental and physical conditions as examples
of vulnerabilities).
91. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174.
92. See generally id.
93. See Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 635.
94. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2 (U.S.
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inability to walk regardless of whether it is due to paralysis or infancy.95
Thus, a court must account for the context of the characteristic upon which
it predicates a finding of vulnerability.96
Another example that illustrates the distinction between a permissible
and impermissible factor of vulnerability can be found in the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in Ramos.97 In United States v. Ramos, the Fifth Circuit declined
to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement in addition to a sadisticconduct enhancement.98
The court found that the sadistic-conduct
enhancement covered the vulnerability of bondage to which the group of
victims was subjected.99 The court found that the eight-year old victims
could not be classified as vulnerable based on their age, and that the
vulnerability finding could only be based on the bondage they were
subjected to during their abuse.100 Unlike the Dowell court, the court here
correctly declined to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement.101 The
Ramos court rejected the government’s argument that the penetration of
some children by adult males constituted a distinct enough harm from the
bondage harm as to necessitate the vulnerable victim enhancement.102
This argument is reminiscent of the district court’s reasoning in Dowell,
in which it explained that the victim under twelve enhancement was too
broad and did not account for the distinct harm caused by sexual assault on
a child as young as three years old.103 Just as the eight-year-old victims in
Ramos had no separate vulnerability aside from the bondage factor, the
three-year-old victim in Dowell had no separate vulnerability that was not
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
95. See United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2013).
96. See id. at 214 (finding that inability to walk is a vulnerability regardless of the
cause of that disability). But see Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 635 (predicating the
vulnerability on the fact that the victim was asleep because the underlying offense
already accounted for her young age).
97. See United States v. Ramos, 739 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2014).
98. See id.
99. See id. (determining that the eight- to ten-year old victims did not have an agerelated vulnerability as compared to the other pre-pubescent victims, but that only the
bondage left these victims more vulnerable than the other victims).
100. See id.
101. Compare Ramos, 739 F.3d at 253, with United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162,
174 (4th Cir. 2014).
102. See Ramos, 739 F.3d at 253 (directing the inquiry focus instead on the factor
that makes the person a vulnerable victim and whether this was already incorporated in
the offense guideline).
103. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 173 (pointing out that the stark differences in reaction
by the three year old victim and the five year old victim explain why the victim under
twelve enhancement “paints with too broad a brush”).
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already accounted for by the age factor.104 It was the underdeveloped
cognitive faculties and psychological susceptibility that led the district
court in Dowell to find a vulnerability, but this was too intimately linked to
Minor A’s age to allow for a permissible application of the enhancement.105
The Fourth Circuit’s holding that the vulnerable victim enhancement was
inappropriate is supported by the case law of its sister circuits.106 The key
point of analysis in the aforementioned cases turns on the fact that the
factor leading to a finding of vulnerability is wholly separate and distinct
from the basis of the underlying offense.107 The Ninth Circuit in Archdale
correctly predicated a finding of vulnerability on the Archdale victim’s
cognitive impairment.108 The characteristics relevant in Archdale were that
the victim had borderline intelligence and participated in special education
classes – factors completely independent of the fact that she was a minor.109
Similarly, the Wetchie court allowed the vulnerable victim enhancement
because the victim’s incapacitation and inability to resist and call for help
were due to her being asleep, not because of factors relating to her young
age.110 The Ramos court supported this reasoning by holding that the
Ramos victims had no separate vulnerability aside from the bondage factor,
which had already been taken into account.111 These cases emphasize the
need for courts to take in the context, cause, or source of the vulnerable
factors to ensure that they do not stem from the same factors already
accounted for by the underlying offense.112
B. The Fourth Circuit Could Have Found a Vulnerability
on an Alternate Basis
The Fourth Circuit in Dowell could have successfully applied the
vulnerable victim enhancement under the theory that Minor A was
vulnerable, not due to her cognitive faculties, but because Dowell lived in
the same residence as the victims.113 A co-habitual relationship renders a
104. Compare Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174, with Ramos, 739 F.3d at 253.
105. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 175.
106. See United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 869 (9th Cir. 2002); United

States v. Wetchie, 207 F.3d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2000); Ramos, 739 F.3d at 253.
107. See Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 635.
108. See Archdale, 229 F.3d at 869.
109. See id.
110. See Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 635.
111. See Ramos, 739 F.3d at 253.
112. See Archdale, 229 F.3d at 869; see also Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 635; Ramos, 739
F.3d at 253.
113. See generally United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2012)
(predicating the vulnerable victim enhancement on victim’s familial relationship to the
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victim particularly susceptible to abuse because the victim is physically
more easily accessible to the abuser and presents an opportunity for an
abuser to nurture a relationship of trust of which he could take
advantage.114 In Gawthrop, the Sixth Circuit held that defendant’s
grandfather-granddaughter relationship to the victim fell within the range
of relationships upon which a finding of victim vulnerability could be
predicated.115 This holding, which was based on similar reasoning as the
Fourth Circuit, stated that the finding of vulnerability must be based on a
factor other than that which had already been accounted for in the
underlying offense.116
Similarly to how the Sixth Circuit based its finding on the familial
relationship between a grandfather and granddaughter, the Fourth Circuit in
Dowell could have explored the unique vulnerability of the victims due to
their close proximity and exposure to the defendant.117 The fact that
Dowell lived in the same house as the victims during the time of their
abuse made the victims particularly susceptible to abuse.118 A co-habitual
relationship poses the same vulnerabilities as a familial relationship, but
would not constitute impermissible double counting because the
cohabitation factor is in no way accounted for by the underlying offense,
which only accounts for the young age of the victims.119
The commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines accords broad judicial
discretion by allowing for a finding of vulnerability based on conditions
that make the victim particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.120 In
United States v. Grubbs, the Fourth Circuit predicated a finding of
vulnerability based on the fact that Grubbs awarded his victims with higher

defendant since age had already been taken into account under the underlying offense
guideline).
114. See id.; see also United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 870 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that because of the abuser’s length of association with the victim and his
proximity to her through their co-habitation, the abuser should have known the victim
was unusually vulnerable to his abuse).
115. See Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 412.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See United States v. Dowell, 771 162, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2014) (indicating that
Dowell engaged in the sexual abuse of the victims during his stay at the residence
where the victims also lived).
119. See Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 413 (relying on a completely separate factor for the
basis of victim vulnerability in order to circumvent the issue of impermissible double
counting).
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
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grades, gave them gifts, and guaranteed them the receipt of scholarships.121
The underlying offense in Grubbs relied on both the age of the victims and
the victims being in Grubbs’ care.122 The court avoided predicating the
vulnerable victim enhancement on these prohibited factors and so instead
relied on the unique position of power Grubbs had over the victims.123
Much like how the victims in Grubbs were particularly susceptible to
abuse due to the nature of Grubbs’ relationship to his victims, the Fourth
Circuit in Dowell could have focused its findings on the fact that Dowell’s
victims were similarly susceptible to Dowell’s abuses due to their close
proximity in the same residence.124 The Fourth Circuit thus could have
avoided the murky reasoning of the district court by focusing Dowell’s cohabitual relationship to the victims.125 And though the factual findings did
not indicate whether Dowell had some other element of trust over the
victims, such factual inquiries may be necessary when the underlying
offense is based on the young age of the victims.126
Courts should base the finding of vulnerability not based on the
depravity of the defendant’s conduct, but on the particular characteristics of
the victim in each case.127 For instance, the vulnerable victim enhancement
statute requires only two findings: the victim must be particularly
vulnerable and the defendant should have had knowledge of the victim’s
vulnerability.128 In United States v. Willoughby, the Sixth Circuit upheld
the application of the vulnerable victim enhancement for a victim, not
because the minor victim was unduly influenced and preyed upon by the
defendant, but because her status as a homeless, destitute runaway rendered
her particularly susceptible to abuse.129 Similarly, the court in United
States v. Irving focused on whether the minor victims were “unusually”

121. See United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 806 (4th Cir. 2009).
122. See id. at 805.
123. See id. at 806 (noting that Grubbs bribed the victims with gifts and money in

order to earn their trust and place himself in a position of power over the boys).
124. Compare United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2014), with
Grubbs, 585 F.3d at 806.
125. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 164-65.
126. See id.
127. See generally United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 2014)
(finding the victim vulnerable due to her status as a homeless runaway); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014)
(focusing the statutory analysis on the characteristics of the victim with no mention of
any standards in regards to the type of criminal conduct by the defendant).
128. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
129. See Willoughby, 742 F.3d at 241.
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vulnerable rather than on the egregiousness of the defendant traveling all
the way to Mexico and Honduras to target young children.130 There, the
court held that the unusual vulnerability stemmed from the fact that the
victims were street urchins who were homeless and without parental
guidance, which made them vulnerable independently of their ages.131
As seen in the victims in Irving and Willoughby, similar vulnerable
characteristics rendered the victim in Dowell particularly susceptible to
abuse.132 For instance, the vulnerabilities of the victims in Willoughby and
Irving stemmed from their homelessness and lack of parental guidance,
which is similar to Minor A’s cohabitation with the defendant in Dowell.133
The fact that Dowell was able to record several videos of himself abusing
Minors A and B indicates that he spent time with them alone without the
supervision of the victims’ parents.134 It is this factor that rendered the
victims in Dowell unusually vulnerable, independently of their ages and the
cognitive and psychological developments that are related to their young
ages.135 Additionally, just as how the homeless status of the victims in
Willoughby contributed to their susceptibility and how the lack of parental
guidance of the victims in Irving presented the defendant with the
opportunity to sexually abuse the victims, the presumed lack of the victims’
parental guidance in Dowell and the victims’ particular susceptibility due to
their cohabitation with the defendant similarly contributed to the
vulnerability of Dowell’s victims.136
Additionally, in United States v. Snyder, the Seventh Circuit applied a
vulnerable victim enhancement to Snyder’s child pornography conviction
premising the enhancement on the victim’s history of molestation.137 In
predicating the victim’s vulnerability on the fact that he had been sexually
130. See United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2009).
131. See id. (“[T]he victims were especially vulnerable because anybody who

comes along and offers the promise of a free meal has a special attraction to people in
that economic and social circumstance.”).
132. See United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2014) (recalling
that Dowell resided in the same residence as the victims, but not clarifying the exact
nature of, or reasons for, Dowell’s habitation at the house).
133. See id. at 165.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 174; see also Irving, 554 F.3d at 75.
136. Compare United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 2014) and
Irving, 554 F.3d at 75, with Dowell, 771 F.3d at 165 (inferring from the vague facts
presented that the victim’s parents were not present during the multiple incidents of
abuse).
137. See United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 649 (7th Cir. 1999) (justifying the
vulnerable victim enhancement on the fact that the vulnerability was based on Doe’s
history of past sexual abuse rather than any age related factors).
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abused three years earlier, the court focused on Snyder’s knowledge of that
past abuse in determining whether to apply the vulnerable victim
sentencing enhancement.138 Though the Snyder victim had been raped
three years before Snyder sexually abused the victim, the Seventh Circuit
did not emphasize how far in the past the abuse had to occur in order to
satisfy the vulnerability finding.139 In the same vein, the Dowell court
could have based a finding of vulnerability on the fact that Minors A and B
had also been molested in the past.140 Dowell started recording himself
abusing Minors A and B in late 2010, and continued to do so until early
2011, producing several videos over the course of that time.141 There, the
past abuse would be that which occurred in 2010, making the victims
increasingly more susceptible and vulnerable throughout the months until
early 2011.142
Additionally, in Snyder, the defendant was not responsible for the past
rape of the victim, as it was three years prior to Snyder’s acquaintance with
the victim; in Dowell, the same defendant committed both the past and
subsequent abuses.143 Though the Seventh Circuit did not discuss the
implication of the Snyder victim’s two different abusers, the Fourth Circuit
could have a reasonable argument in finding Minors A and B vulnerable as
a result of Dowell’s knowing and repeated abuses against them.144
IV. CONCLUSION
In declining to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement to an
underlying offense of child pornography and sexual abuse of a minor, the
Fourth Circuit created a circuit split against the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.145
However, as evidenced by the discussion above, the Fourth Circuit
correctly interpreted the enhancement and did not err in holding that the

138. See id.
139. See id. at 643, 649.
140. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 165 (recalling that Dowell recorded several videos of

himself sexually assaulting Minors A and B).
141. See id. at 164-65 (inferring that the production of multiple video recordings
presupposes multiple instances of abuse).
142. See id.
143. Compare Snyder, 189 F.3d at 643, 649, with Dowell, 771 F.3d at 165.
144. Compare Snyder, 189 F.3d at 649, with Dowell, 771 F.3d at 165 (applying the
vulnerable victim enhancement in Snyder based on the fact that Snyder knew the victim
was abused in the past but failing to pursue this avenue in Dowell). But see United
States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that Jenkins’ victim was
their 11-month old son but failing to analyze whether the vulnerability could be
predicated on this familial relationship rather than the victim’s age).
145. See Dowell, 771 F.3d at 174 (4th Cir. 2014).
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district court had impermissibly applied the enhancement. Although the
Fourth Circuit did not analyze whether the vulnerable victim enhancement
could have been predicated on characteristics such as the victim’s
cohabitation with Dowell or that they were left without parental guidance,
such findings could have supported an appropriate application of the
enhancement.
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